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385 
WHY INTERNATIONAL CATCH 
SHARES WON’T SAVE OCEAN 
BIODIVERSITY 
Holly Doremus* 
Skepticism about the efficacy and efficiency of regulatory approaches has produced 
a wave of enthusiasm for market-based strategies for dealing with environmental 
conflicts. In the fisheries context, the most prominent of these strategies is the use 
of “catch shares,” which assign specific proportions of the total allowable catch to 
individuals who are then free to trade them with others. Catch shares are now in 
wide use domestically within many nations, and there are increasing calls for 
implementation of internationally tradable catch shares. Based on a review of 
theory, empirical evidence, and two contexts in which catch shares have been 
proposed, this Article explains why international catch shares are not likely to  
arrest the decline of ocean biodiversity. Catch shares were developed to promote 
greater economic efficiency and profitability in the fishing industry. They have 
proven capable of doing so at the domestic level, although their effects on wealth 
distribution have frequently been controversial. Theoretical and empirical  
support for the proposition that catch shares promote conservation, especially of 
non-target resources, is thinner. Furthermore, in the international context catch 
shares face special challenges. Catch shares cannot resolve the value differences 
that underlie the most intractable disagreements about international fisheries 
management. They are less likely to reduce conflicts over total allowable catch in 
the international than in the domestic context, because distrust of managers and 
competitors runs deeper. Finally, catch share strategies require effective enforce-
ment, which is both institutionally and practically difficult to provide for many 
international fisheries. In general, catch shares are not a promising route to  
improving international fisheries management, and pursuing them could distract 
the international community from more important steps toward improving  
conservation of global ocean resources. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is currently a great deal of enthusiasm, in both the domestic and 
the international contexts, for property rights-based approaches to fishery 
management. Such approaches, most commonly in the form of “catch 
shares,” or individually allocated portions of the total allowable catch 
(TAC), have been adopted in a number of nations for fisheries covering a 
number of stocks. Although there are not yet any international catch share 
fisheries, recent proposals suggest a move in that direction may be inevitable. 
In this Article, I evaluate international catch share strategies as conserva-
tion tools and find them wanting. Catch shares have had positive economic 
effects in a range of domestic fisheries, but are not necessarily useful for 
addressing ecological problems. They may reduce conflict over total allowable 
catch levels, but only if the participants have a long time horizon and believe 
catch restrictions are necessary. At the same time, catch share programs 
enhance conflicts over the allocation of rights, which are commonly a major 
barrier to international fishery agreements. Finally, property rights-based 
fisheries management requires committed and effective enforcement insti-
tutions, which are notably lacking in many global fisheries. 
A closer look at two contexts in which tradable property rights have 
been proposed—to govern the harvest of whales and bluefin tuna—shows 
that such proposals would face high political and practical hurdles, without 
offering much added conservation value. While many international fisheries 
clearly need better management and frustration with current regulatory 
approaches is understandable, introducing catch shares should not be the 
first priority. The effort to make a catch share strategy work could unpro-
ductively distract from addressing more important needs. 
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I. FROM COMMONS TO CATCH SHARES 
Fisheries present a classic tragedy of the commons.1 Traditionally,  
national and international law protected rights of open access; the freedom 
of anyone who wanted to do so to participate in fisheries was fiercely 
guarded. That was not a problem when pressure on ocean resources was 
limited. At that point, the seas were effectively inexhaustible relative to the 
ability and desire of human beings to exploit them. But as demand for fish 
and the sophistication of fishing technologies increased, the tradition of 
open access became problematic both for fishermen and for their targets. 
Put most simply, the problem was (and is) that too many boats were 
chasing too few fish. From the fisherman’s perspective, that meant that the 
economic rents of resource exploitation were lost, or to put it in less  
abstract terms, that profits were elusive. With essentially no barriers to 
entry, fishery participants dissipated a greater and greater share of revenues 
in an unwinnable arms race, adding vessels and equipment so that they 
might capture fish before their competitors could do so. The costs of fishing 
rose until the industry was barely profitable.2 Not only were incomes kept 
low, risks to life and limb were kept high. Commercial fishing, always a 
dangerous occupation, became even more so as fishermen sought to maximize 
their share of the catch. 
From a conservation perspective, traditional open access fishing was 
equally problematic. Fishermen had no incentive to leave fish in the ocean, 
where they would be available to the first comer. Sustainable harvest might 
be to the benefit of the entire industry, but participants who were unable to 
restrain the behavior of their competitors would be foolish to restrain them-
selves. The economically rational behavior was a mad scramble in which 
everyone sought to grab as much fish as they could in the short run, without 
regard to long-term effects on the resource. The predictable outcome was 
“fishing down food webs.”3 The easiest and most lucrative targets were 
fished out to the point where chasing them no longer made economic sense. 
Then the industry moved on to the next target, and the next. 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
 1. Garrett Hardin is famous for coining this phrase. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of 
the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). But the idea had been articulated in the fisheries 
context years earlier. H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: 
The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124, 134–35 (1954). 
 2. Indeed, the industry may operate at a deficit. One report several years ago pegged 
annual costs at $124 billion, compared to harvest value of only $70 billion. Carrie Tipton, 
Note, Protecting Tomorrow's Harvest: Developing a National System of Individual Transferable 
Quotas to Conserve Ocean Resources, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 381, 390 (1995). 
 3. Daniel Pauly et al., Fishing Down Marine Food Webs, 279 SCIENCE 860 (1998). 
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This uncontrolled fish chase threatened entire marine ecosystems, not 
just target species. If harvests could be increased or speeded up by the use 
of bottom trawls4 or enormous drift nets,5 it was entirely rational for  
fishermen locked in competition with one another to adopt those methods. 
By-catch and incidental effects on non-target species were unintended but 
apparently unavoidable consequences of the race to capture the resource. As 
in other contexts, the combination of two legal rules—(1) that the resources 
of the ocean were unowned until reduced to possession; and (2) that anyone 
could pursue those resources—inevitably encouraged waste and overexploi-
tation. 
By the 1950s, economists had noted the consequences of the inefficient 
and destructive race for fish, and suggested that private property rights 
might hold solutions.6 In the short run, however, those insights had little 
practical consequence for ocean fisheries. Prevailing circumstances made 
privatization seem both unnecessary and impractical. The resources of the 
seas were still widely viewed as inexhaustible; although landings in some 
                                                                                                                      
 4. The Natural Resources Defense Council has compared bottom trawling to land-
based strip mining: “Bottom trawlers drag giant weighted nets along the ocean floor, ripping 
up or scooping out whatever they encounter, including ancient coral forests, gardens of 
anemones and entire fields of sea sponges . . . . Trawling nets, huge weighted bags, can be 
200 feet wide and 40 feet high, weigh as much as 1,000 pounds, and can be sunk to depths of 
5,000 feet or more beneath the water's surface. Heavier, stronger gear allows trawl nets to 
plow over rocky bottoms, destroying the underwater corals, sponges and rock structures that 
provide important habitat for fish.” Protecting Ocean Habitat from Bottom Trawling, NATURAL 
RES. DEF. COUNCIL (Feb. 1, 2007), http://www.nrdc.org/water/oceans/ftrawling.asp.  
Although most of it occurs in very deep waters, the sediment plumes stirred up by bottom 
trawling reach the surface, where they can be seen from space. Bottom Trawling Impacts on 
Ocean, Clearly Visible from Space, SCI. DAILY (Feb. 20, 2008), http://www.sciencedaily.com/ 
releases/2008/02/080215121207.htm. In addition to destroying seafloor habitat, bottom 
trawls “catch everything in their path, including endangered sea turtles, juvenile fish and 
other unwanted species.” MONTEREY BAY AQUARIUM, FISHING METHODS FACT CARD, 
available at http://www.montereybayaquarium.org/cr/cr_seafoodwatch/content/media/MBA_ 
SeafoodWatch_TrapsandPots&TrawlingFactCards.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2012). 
 5. Drift nets are enormous fine mesh panels hung vertically in the ocean. They are 
non-selective, designed to catch or entangle whatever swims into them. They have been used 
for centuries, but have long been a source of conflict both because they are capable of so 
efficiently killing their target species and because they also kill large numbers of non-target 
fish, birds, and marine mammals. See Stuart Sugarman, The Failure to Achieve a High Seas 
Driftnet Ban, 3 INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 5 (1992); SIMON P. NORTHRIDGE, DRIFTNET 
FISHERIES AND THEIR IMPACTS ON NON-TARGET SPECIES: A WORLDWIDE REVIEW (FAO 
Fisheries Technical Paper No. 320, 1991), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/ 
T0502E/T0502E00.htm#TOC. High-seas driftnetting began in the 1970s, prompted by the 
expulsion of foreign fisheries from newly expanded Exclusive Economic Zones and facilitated 
by the development of strong thin nylon filament. See Sugarman, supra. The U.N. General 
Assembly in 1991 called for a worldwide moratorium on large-scale high seas driftnet fishing 
effective in 1993. G.A. Res. 46/215, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/215 (Dec. 20, 1991). 
 6. E.g., H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The 
Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954). 
Doremus_Final_Web_Ready_FINAL_12May2013 7/18/2013  4:24 PM 
Spring 2013] Why International Catch Shares Won’t Save Ocean Biodiversity 389 
 
fisheries had already declined, many believed those declines were cyclical 
rather than the result of systematic overexploitation.7 There was a great deal 
of skepticism that restraint on the part of fishermen would make a differ-
ence to population levels. Furthermore, the legal regime allowed vessels 
from every nation to fish most of the world’s oceans, with the exception of 
narrow territorial seas. That created a kind of prisoner’s dilemma. It made 
little sense for any individual nation to restrict fishing when others might 
not do so. That nations could only supervise vessels flying their flag made 
the situation worse. Imposing stringent domestic regulations might simply 
trigger a flight of vessels to flags of convenience, and nations with little 
direct stake in fisheries could capture vessel registration revenues by offering 
lax regulatory regimes. 
A few fisheries were both sufficiently valuable and so obviously in  
decline as to justify early negotiation of multilateral treaties allowing 
stronger management. Whaling provides the most prominent example. 
Several species of whales were hunted to near extinction by the early  
twentieth century.8 Eventually the whaling nations realized that some form 
of international regulation was necessary. In 1946, after a protracted gestation 
period,9 they agreed to the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling (hereinafter the “Whaling Convention”),10 creating an ostensibly 
science-driven process to set enforceable harvest limits at sustainable levels. 
While the Whaling Convention for decades functioned more as a “whaling 
club” than an effective conservation institution,11 its adoption signaled a 
new willingness of fishing nations to cede authority to international  
institutions.12 
In the 1970s, pressure from nations anxious to limit the incursion of 
foreign fishing fleets produced a dramatic shift in the other direction,  
toward stronger national control of ocean resources. Sovereign interests 
were expanded to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extending as much as 
                                                                                                                      
 7. See, e.g., Harry N. Scheiber, Ocean Governance and the Marine Fisheries Crisis: Two 
Decades of Innovation—and Frustration, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 119, 119–20 (2001). 
 8. For a brief history of whaling and its impacts on whale populations, see Lisa 
Kobayashi, Lifting the International Whaling Commission’s Moratorium on Commercial Whaling as 
the Most Effective Global Regulation of Whaling, 29 ENVIRONS 177, 180–84 (2006). 
 9. For discussion of the history of the Whaling Convention, see Cinnamon Pinon 
Carlarne, Saving the Whales in the New Millennium: International Institutions, Recent Develop-
ments and the Future of International Whaling Policies, 24 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 5 (2005).  
 10. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 
1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72, [hereinafter ICRW] available at iwc.int/cache/downloads/1r2jdhu5xtus 
wws0ocw04wgcw/convention.pdf. 
 11. Id. at 6–7. 
 12. Id. at 5. 
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200 miles from the coast.13 That expansion brought a much larger proportion 
of the world’s fisheries under national control, encouraging the develop-
ment of domestic regulatory regimes for ocean fisheries.14  
The earliest domestic ocean fishery management regimes relied primarily 
on catch limits, coupled with seasonal and geographic closures and gear 
restrictions. Fairly quickly, however, some important fishing nations began 
to incorporate property rights approaches.15  
In the 1980s, for example, individual transferable quotas (ITQs) were 
assigned to participants in several fisheries in New Zealand and Australia.16 
Initially, these quotas were quantitatively specific, meaning that quota holders 
were given the right to harvest a specified mass of fish in perpetuity.17 That 
approach turned out not to work very well, however, because the available 
harvest in many fisheries varies widely from year to year. Within a few 
years, fishery managers decided that a better strategy was to combine  
property rights with catch limits. Fishery participants were assigned rights 
to a proportion of the TAC, assuring them of a continued role in the fishery 
without guaranteeing a specific level of harvest.18  
“Catch shares,” as these proportional rights are often called, need not 
be transferable. Nations seeking to maximize the economic productivity of 
their fisheries, however, often make them transferable, sometimes subject to 
restrictions. As implemented, therefore, the catch share strategy is typically 
                                                                                                                      
 13. This expansion of sovereign territory began with unilateral declarations by coastal 
states such as the United States, but was then endorsed by the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, Art. 57, Dec. 10, 1982, 1883 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 
1994), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_ 
e.pdf. See also Scheiber, supra note 7, at 126. 
 14. Scheiber, supra note 7, at 126 (noting that “an estimated 85% or more of commer-
cially exploitable fish stocks and all then-known exploitable seabed mineral resources were 
located in the EEZ ocean areas”). Although the high seas contain only a small proportion of 
commercially important ocean resources, transboundary, straddling and highly migratory 
stocks are all beyond the regulatory control of any single nation. Katrina M. Wyman, The 
Property Rights Challenge in Marine Fisheries, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 511, 518 (2008). 
 15. Indeed, fisheries economists had been among those arguing for expanded national 
exclusive economic zones precisely because they saw division of the oceans into sovereign 
territories as laying the essential groundwork for the establishment of property rights in 
ocean resources. Id. at 512. 
 16. Iceland may have been the first nation to try individual fishing quotas (IFQs), 
starting in 1979. Ragnar Arnason, Ocean Fisheries Management: Recent International Develop-
ments, 17 MARINE POL’Y 334, 338 (1993). New Zealand seems to have jumped in most 
enthusiastically. Since 1990, New Zealand’s fisheries have all been subject to catch share 
management. Alison Rieser, Property Rights and Ecosystem Management in U.S. Fisheries: 
Contracting for the Commons?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 813, 823–24 (1997). 
 17. John H. Annala, New Zealand’s ITQ System: Have the First Eight Years Been a 
Success or a Failure?, 6 REVS. FISH BIOLOGY & FISHERIES 43, 45 (1996); Richard G. Newell 
et al., Fishing Quota Markets, 49 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 437, 442 (2005). 
 18. Id. 
Doremus_Final_Web_Ready_FINAL_12May2013 7/18/2013  4:24 PM 
Spring 2013] Why International Catch Shares Won’t Save Ocean Biodiversity 391 
 
an example of the more general “cap-and-trade” approach. Regulators set a 
cap on the allowable harvest, assign industry participants rights to a portion 
of that cap, and allow rights holders to sell or lease those rights to others. 
Catch shares are currently the dominant property rights tools in fisheries 
management worldwide.19 
The expansion of catch share programs has coincided with a more general 
shift from exclusively regulatory regimes toward market-based approaches 
to environmental protection and resource management. In the 1970s, just 
about the time that EEZs grew dramatically, economists (particularly in the 
United States) began emphasizing the inefficiencies of uniform pollution 
regulations and promoting the use of market-based tools such as tradable 
permits as a more cost-effective approach.20 There is a prominent economic 
literature arguing that the “evolution of property rights”—that is, the gradual 
development of stronger individual property rights over time—is an  
inevitable and desirable process for resources under exploitation pressure.21 
Although many environmentalists were initially skeptical of property 
rights approaches to pollution and resource management, many (though 
certainly not all) have been won over, at least in a general sense. Property 
rights approaches seem to offer pragmatic political benefits, reducing  
resistance to environmental protection. One prominent example from the 
United States is the acid rain program. Environmental advocates had been 
agitating for twenty years for stronger control of the sulfur dioxide and 
                                                                                                                      
 19. It bears noting that catch shares and similar individuated strategies are not the 
only form property rights-based fisheries might take. See Alison Rieser, Property Rights and 
Ecosystem Management in U.S. Fisheries: Contracting for the Commons?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 813, 
818–29 (1997) (offering a taxonomy of potential property rights arrangements in fisheries); 
Katrina M. Wyman, The Property Rights Challenge in Marine Fisheries, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 511 
(2008) (arguing that the optimal property rights structure for fisheries is a context-sensitive 
mix of public and private property rights). Because catch shares so dominate contemporary 
policy discussions, however, they are the focus of the discussion in this paper. 
 20. See, e.g., JOHN H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES (1968); WILLIAM J. 
BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1975); BRUCE 
ACKERMAN & WILLIAM HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981); ROBERT W. CRANDALL, 
CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLEAN AIR 
(1983); THOMAS TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING 
POLLUTION POLICY (1985); Richard B. Stewart, Economics, Environment, and the Limits of 
Legal Control, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1985); Albert M. McGartland & Wallace E. Oates, 
Marketable Permits for the Prevention of Environmental Deterioration, 12 J. ENVTL. ECON. & 
MGMT. 207 (1985). 
 21. See, e.g., Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of 
the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 167 (1975); Saul Levmore, Two Stories about the 
Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S421, S421 (2002); Gary D. Libecap & James 
L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights in the United States, 31 J. LEGAL 
STUD. S589, S589 (2002). Although he did not use evolutionary language, Harold Demsetz 
is the original source of these ideas. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 
57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967). 
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nitrogen oxide emissions responsible for acidification of lakes and streams 
in eastern North America. Calls for stronger regulation were unsuccessful.22 
But switching to a cap-and-trade strategy reduced industry resistance  
sufficiently that an acid rain control program eventually made it through 
the legislature in 1990.23 Today, that program is widely credited with reducing 
emissions more rapidly and at far lower cost than industry had predicted 
would be possible.24  
Not surprisingly, given this bipartisan appeal, cap-and-trade approaches 
have spread rapidly, including in the fisheries management world. By the 
mid-2000s, management of at least 120 fisheries worldwide employed a 
catch share strategy in some form,25 and property rights more generally had 
become the dominant focus of fishery policy discussions.26 There are also 
existing and developing markets for greenhouse gas emissions,27 for emissions 
of conventional air pollutants,28 for discharges of pollutants to water,29 and 
for endangered species habitat.30 
                                                                                                                      
 22. E. Donald Elliott, Lessons from Implementing the 1990 CAA Amendments, 40 ENVTL. 
L. REP. 10592, 10595 (2010). 
 23. Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, Title IV (1990) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651o). 
 24. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, James L. Connaughton & Lesley C. Foxhall, Design-
ing an International Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System, 15 NATURAL RES. & ENV’T 160, 
161–62 (2001); A. DENNY ELLERMAN, PAUL L. JOSKOW & DAVID HARRISON, JR., PEW CTR. 
ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, EMISSIONS TRADING IN THE U.S.: EXPERIENCE, LESSONS, 
AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES 15 (May 2003), available at 
http://www.c2es.org/publications/emissions-trading-us-experience-lessons-and-considerations-
greenhouse-gases. 
 25. Christopher Costello et al., Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries Collapse?, 321 
SCIENCE 1678, 1679 (2008) [hereinafter Costello, Fisheries Collapse]; see also Richard G. 
Newell et al., Fishing Quota Markets, 49 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 437, 437–38 (2005) 
(asserting that fishing quotas have been instituted in more than fifteen countries for the 
management of more than eighty species). 
 26. E.g., Seth Macinko & Daniel W. Bromley, Property and Fisheries for the Twenty-First 
Century: Seeking Coherence from Legal and Economic Doctrine, 28 VT. L. REV. 623, 625 (2004) 
(“[C]ontemporary beliefs about the role and nature of property rights in fisheries seem to be 
so strongly entrenched as to dominate nearly all discussions of fisheries policy.”). 
 27. David Harrison, Jr. et al., Using Emissions Trading to Combat Global Climate Change: 
Programs and Key Issues, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10367 (2008). 
 28. Daniel A. Farber, Pollution Markets and Social Equity: Analyzing the Fairness of Cap 
and Trade, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 10–16 (2012). 
 29. Emissions Trading Moves to Water, But It’s Not as Simple, ENVTL. F., March–April 
2003, at 62–69; CONSERVATION TECH. INFO. CTR., GETTING PAID FOR STEWARDSHIP: AN 
AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITY WATER QUALITY TRADING GUIDE (July 2006), available at 
http://ctic.org/media/users/lvollmer/pdf/GPfS_final%281%29.pdf; RENA STEINZOR ET AL., 
WATER QUALITY TRADING IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY (Ctr. for Progressive Reform, Briefing 
Paper No. 1205, May 2012), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/ 
WQT_1205.pdf. 
 30. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl et al., A Practical Guide to Conservation Banking Law and Policy, 
20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T., Summer 2005, at 26; Jonathan Remy Nash, Trading Species: 
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Few of these markets are truly international yet, but there are increasingly 
calls for international environmental trading systems. Carbon markets are 
the most high-profile example,31 but fishery quota proposals are also  
prominent. Some observers have long regarded the spread of individual 
quota systems as inevitable.32 Recently, specific proposals for international 
tradable quota systems for the harvest of ocean resources have begun to 
appear. A few months ago, for example, a paper appeared in the high-
profile journal Nature urging that the Whaling Commission create freely 
tradable whale harvest permits.33 Commentators have also proposed the use 
of catch shares in the Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery,34 and the Indian Ocean 
Tuna Commission is considering allocation of tradable quota shares to its 
member states.35  
Like enthusiasm for property rights approaches to environmental  
protection in general, enthusiasm for such approaches to fisheries manage-
ment, while expanding, is by no means universal. Opponents object to 
privatization of a resource they view as peculiarly public,36 are skeptical of 
the practical ability to implement property rights approaches,37 and fear the 
potential distributional impacts.38 
                                                                                                                      
A New Direction for Habitat Trading Programs, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2007); 
SPECIESBANKING.COM, http://www.speciesbanking.com (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (describing 
itself as “a global information clearinghouse for a segment of biodiversity markets focusing 
on biodiversity offsetting, compensation and offset banking”); Endangered Species Program, 
For Landowners, Conservation Banking, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., 
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/landowners/conservation-banking.html (last visited Nov. 8, 
2012). 
 31. The Kyoto Protocol included three mechanisms for trading carbon emissions 
across international lines. Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy: Cap-and-Trade 
and Complementary Policies, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207, 222–23 (2012). Although a successor 
agreement to Kyoto has not yet been negotiated, it seems very likely that any such agreement 
will include international emissions trading. For one form such trading could take, see Erin 
Sedloff, Creating a Category Under the Kyoto Protocol Based on Non Emissions, 18 HASTINGS W.-
NW. J. ENVTL. L & POL’Y 379 (2012).  
 32. Arnason, supra note 16, at 339. 
 33. Christopher Costello et al., A Market Approach to Saving the Whales, 481 NATURE 
139 (2012) [hereinafter Costello, Market Approach]. 
 34. See Seth Korman, International Management of a High Seas Fishery: Political and 
Property-Rights Solutions and the Atlantic Bluefin, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 697 (2010–11). 
 35. Jeremy Noye & Kwame Mfodwo, First Steps Toward a Quota Allocation System in the 
Indian Ocean, 36 MARINE POL’Y 882 (2012). 
 36. See, e.g., Alison Rieser, Prescriptions for the Commons: Environmental Scholarship and 
the Fishing Quotas Debate, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 414 (1999). 
 37. See, e.g., Eric M. Singer, Towards a Sustainable Fishery: The Price-Cap Approach, 24 
TULANE ENVTL. L.J. 253, 285 (2011) (“That legal battles and a legislative moratorium have 
resulted from the thorny issue of ITQ allocation suggests that, for political reasons, an 
efficient ITQ system may be very difficult to implement in many fisheries.”); Parzival 
Copes, A Critical Review of the Individual Quota as a Device in Fisheries Management, 62 LAND 
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II. FOR BETTER OR WORSE? 
This is an opportune moment to examine the possibilities and limits of 
property rights approaches as tools for international fisheries management. 
Such approaches have yet to make substantial inroads on the international 
scene, but are increasingly proposed as solutions to management of interna-
tional ocean resources.39 Moreover, the oldest domestic catch share programs 
have been in effect for thirty years now, and should provide some data about 
the performance of property rights programs. 
Although both proponents and opponents of property rights approaches 
often seem to argue from faith-based absolutist stances, the reality is more 
nuanced.40 Catch shares are not a silver bullet for the multiple problems of 
ailing global fisheries any more than any other strategy is. I draw three 
lessons relevant to international marine resources from the theory and 
history of property rights approaches to fisheries management. First, the 
usefulness of property rights strategies depends critically on the goals of 
management. Property rights strategies were developed to promote the 
economic efficiency of the fishing industry, but management goals are 
typically more diverse than that.41 They may include limiting distributional 
impacts, conserving target and non-target resources, and reducing political 
conflict. Although catch shares can sometimes serve these other goals, they 
do so less directly and not always effectively. Second, to the extent that 
long-term stewardship of the targeted resource is an important goal, the 
ability of a property-rights approach to advance that goal will depend on 
both the economic context and the strength of fishery participants’ beliefs 
that the fishery is both exhaustible and actually declining. The strength of 
that perception will be affected by the type and extent of available data, but 
                                                                                                                      
ECON. 278, 281–88 (1986) (detailing some of the many things that can go wrong in imple-
mentation of ITQ systems). 
 38. See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu and James E. Wilen, Ecosystem Management and the 1996 
Sustainable Fisheries Act, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 799, 809 (1997) (noting that Greenpeace opposition 
to IFQs rests in part on the desire to “keep[] fisheries in the hands of small entrepreneurs”); 
SETH MACINKO & DANIEL W. BROMLEY, WHO OWNS AMERICA’S FISHERIES? (2002). 
 39. See, e.g., ANTHONY COX, QUOTA ALLOCATION IN INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES 7–8 
(OECD Food, Agriculture, and Fisheries Papers, No. 22, 2009), available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/218520326143 (highlighting “the increased use of market mecha-
nisms” such as “cap-and-trade systems . . . in combination with more traditional regulatory 
and planning approaches”). 
 40. The importance of context is beginning to be recognized. See, e.g., Mark Fina, 
Evolution of Catch Share Management: Lessons from Catch Share Management in the North 
Pacific, 36 FISHERIES 164 (2011) (concluding on the basis of the experience of one U.S. 
fishery management council that “catch share management should be undertaken only as 
specific fishery and management needs dictate”). 
 41. U. Rashid Sumaila, A Cautionary Note on Individual Transferable Quotas, 15(3) 
ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 36 (2010) (“[I]t is clear that for fisheries managers, scientists, and the 
public, fisheries management is not about economic efficiency alone.”). 
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also by the level of trust in that data. Third, the success of catch share  
programs depends on effective and credible enforcement institutions, which 
have long been a limiting factor for conventional fisheries management.  
Most catch share programs to date have been implemented in developed 
nations, and have allocated fisheries under single-nation control. Even in 
this context, catch shares are not always the right tool for the job. They are 
much more likely to fail, however, in the international context, which  
complicates disagreements about goals, can undermine trust, and is often 
characterized by weak enforcement. 
A. Goals Matter 
Like many other environmental conflicts, fisheries disputes are “wicked 
problems,”42 meaning they are not objectively definable. People with different 
values and priorities see wicked problems differently and therefore identify 
different solutions. Imagine, for example, a commercial fisherman and a 
marine ecologist looking at a declining fishery. Each may believe that the 
nature of the problem is obvious, but their views of it are likely to be  
dramatically different. The commercial fisherman may focus on limited 
industry profitability. The ecologist, by contrast, will likely assign greater 
importance to long-term effects on ecosystem processes or changes in eco-
system structure. The two observers, given their very different perspectives, 
may have difficulty even communicating with one another about what steps 
to take, or what changes might count as solutions.43 
Identifying and prioritizing goals is perhaps the most fundamental step 
in addressing environmental problems, but one that is often skipped or 
overlooked. It is a crucial step in deciding what role property rights  
approaches should play in fisheries management. Management might, and 
indeed typically does, have several goals, some of which are better served by 
property rights strategies than others. The next sections discuss several 
typical goals, and their relationship to rights-based management. 
1. Economic Efficiency 
Property rights were first identified as the solution to the “fishing 
problem” by economists who defined that problem narrowly as economic 
inefficiency in the fishing industry. In his seminal paper on the economics 
of fisheries, for example, H. Scott Gordon sought to address “the plight of 
                                                                                                                      
 42. Horst W. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4 
POL’Y SCIS. 155, 160–67 (1973). 
 43. Fisheries scientist Ray Hilborn noted precisely this divergence of views in a 2007 
paper. Ray Hilborn, Managing Fisheries is Managing People: What Has Been Learned?, 8 FISH 
& FISHERIES 285, 286 (2007) (“[E]cologists and economists can have very different views of 
a successful fishery . . . their solutions may differ because of their objectives.”). 
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fishermen and the inefficiency of fisheries production,”44 and quoted with 
approval an earlier economist’s definition of the fisheries problem as the 
failure of the harvest “to yield a satisfactory living to the fisherman.”45 A 
year later, following up on Gordon’s work, Anthony Scott similarly  
described the problem as inefficient management of natural resources.46 
Fisheries economists continue to endorse this description of the fisheries 
problem.47 
Both Gordon and Scott argued that a key goal of fisheries management 
should be for fishers and their nations to capture, rather than dissipate, the 
rents of resource extraction. They viewed a lack of firm property rights as 
the key source of inefficiency. Economists today agree that lack of property 
rights facilitates the overcapitalization that continues to plague global fish-
eries. Furthermore, they agree with Gordon and Scott that the race to 
capture fish, made necessary by the lack of ownership rights to the unhar-
vested fish, encourages wasteful fishing behavior.48 In their haste to catch all 
the fish they can as quickly as they can, fishers may overwhelm processing 
facilities, depress the market, and catch fish they cannot profitably sell. At 
the extreme, fishermen are driven to a “derby-style” race that captures the 
entire allowable catch in a few days.49 Derby fishing creates a number of 
problems. It is unsafe.50 It often results in overshooting the TAC, so that 
                                                                                                                      
 44. Gordon, supra note 6, at 134. 
 45. Id. at 125 (quoting A.G. Huntsman, Fishery Depletion, 99 SCIENCE 534 (1944)). 
 46. Anthony Scott, The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership, 63 J. POL. ECON. 116 
(1955). 
 47. See, e.g., Ragnar Arnason, Property Rights as a Means of Economic Organization, in 
U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., USE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FISHRIGHTS99 CONFERENCE 14 (Ross Shotton ed., 2000). 
 48. See, e.g., Costello, Fisheries Collapse, supra note 25; NAT’L OCEANIC & 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NOAA TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM NMFS-F/SPO-86, THE 
DESIGN AND USE OF LIMITED ACCESS PRIVILEGE PROGRAMS 9 (Lee G. Anderson & Mark 
C. Holliday, eds., 2007); R. Quentin Grafton et al., Incentive-Based Approaches to Sustainable 
Fisheries, 63 CAN. J. FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCI. 699 (2006). For a sharply contrasting view, 
see Daniel W. Bromley, Abdicating Responsibility: The Deceits of Fisheries Policy, 34 FISHERIES 
280 (2009). 
 49. The best known example in the United States comes from the Alaska halibut 
fishery, where the season averaged two to three days per year before a catch share program 
was introduced. COMM. TO REVIEW INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTAS ET AL., SHARING THE 
FISH: TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY ON INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTAS 72 (1999) [hereinafter 
SHARING THE FISH]. In 1994, just prior to adoption of the individual quota system, the 
season was down to less than one day. Francis T. Christy, The Death Rattle of Open Access and 
the Advent of Property Rights Regimes in Fisheries, 11 MARINE RESOURCE ECON. 287, 293 
(1996). In the Alaska halibut fishery at its worst, more than six thousand vessels landed 23 
million pounds of halibut in just a few days. Tipton, supra note 2, at 392. 
 50. In the Alaska halibut fishery, for example, the Coast Guard answered twenty-nine 
calls from sinking ships in a single season. Tipton, supra note 2, at 392. 
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harvested fish may need to be discarded.51 It also necessarily pushes the 
industry toward frozen as opposed to fresh fish, even if consumers prefer 
the latter.52  
In theory, both overcapitalization and wasteful fishing behavior can be 
addressed by regulatory measures, but effective regulation is both politically 
and practically challenging. Governments can force some participants out of 
the market, but will face focused political opposition from identified losers. 
Even if they are able to gather the necessary nerve to mandate market 
contraction, governments may not correctly identify the most efficient 
participants; they may end up forcing out the wrong group. Waste has been 
effectively dealt with by regulation or the imposition of liability in another 
common property context, that of the “capture” of oil and natural gas.53 But 
those operations are fixed on the landscape, and observable, in ways that 
fishing practices are not.  
Property rights are certainly a conceptually appropriate tool for  
addressing inefficiency. Not surprisingly, this is the goal catch shares have 
most effectively served. Most observers agree that catch shares have  
improved economic efficiency and reduced overcapitalization.54 There also 
is substantial evidence that catch shares in some fisheries have reduced 
wasteful fishing practices,55 and improved the value or yield of market 
products.56 
2. Wealth Distribution 
Economists, who have been the primary proponents of property rights 
approaches, typically do not prioritize wealth distribution as an important 
aspect of solving the fishery problem. Their major professional goal is 
efficiency. One reason they tend to gravitate toward market approaches is 
                                                                                                                      
 51. Id. 
 52. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at 2–3. In some fisheries, the derby may be so 
extreme that harvested fish cannot even be frozen before they rot. Tipton, supra note 2, at 
392. 
 53. Jim Rossi, The Political Economy of Energy and Its Implications for Climate Change 
Legislation, 84 TULANE L. REV. 379, 384 (2009). 
 54. See, e.g., SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at 65, 85, 99. For a somewhat less 
enthusiastic take on cap-and-trade programs in fisheries and other resource management 
contexts, see Bonnie G. Colby, Cap-and-Trade Policy Challenges: A Tale of Three Markets, 76 
LAND ECON. 638, 640 (2000) (“Actual transactions have been fewer, markets less competitive 
and efficiency gains less impressive than predicted.”). 
 55. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at 74–75 (after introduction of IFQs halibut 
discards and the frequency of exceeding the TAC fell sharply). 
 56. Id. at 34. 
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that in a smoothly functioning market voluntary transactions should achieve 
efficient outcomes regardless of the initial allocation of entitlements.57 
Societies, however, are not necessarily indifferent to distributional  
consequences. Whether distributional outcomes are “equitable,” as the 
relevant society defines that term, can depend critically on the allocation of 
entitlements. Achieving equity may be in tension with achieving efficiency. 
In the fishery context, for example, programs that reduce overcapacity 
almost necessarily decrease employment. Whether improvements in the 
employment conditions for the remaining jobs outweigh the cost of the job 
losses is a question on which reasonable minds are likely to differ. 
Distributional concerns have driven much of the opposition to property 
rights-based fishing regimes in the United States.58 The notion of private 
rights in fisheries is inherently inconsistent with long-standing egalitarian 
norms about access to fishery resources.59 Opponents of catch shares worry 
that small fishers will be priced out of the industry, that fishing-dependent 
communities will suffer or even disappear, and that crew members of fishing 
vessels will be transformed from the economic partners of vessel owners to 
subordinate wage earners.60 
There is evidence that some catch share programs have had precisely 
these sorts of distributional effects, reducing employment and increasing 
the market share of large operators.61 These concerns can be addressed by 
limiting the transferability of catch shares, but such limitations inevitably 
have efficiency costs. The relative importance assigned to efficiency and 
equity, therefore, is important not only to the decision to use catch shares or 
not, but also to the design of any catch share program. 
                                                                                                                      
 57. This is the famous “Coase Theorem.” See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 58. Colby, supra note 54, at 646. 
 59. On those norms, see, for example, Ronald N. Johnson and Gary D. Libecap, 
Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1005, 1006–
07 (1982). 
 60. See, e.g., Hsu and Wilen, supra note 38, at 808 (noting that individual fishing 
quota strategies “will almost certainly have distributional consequences,” including a likely 
reduction in employment in the fishing industry, and potential impacts on related industries 
in fishing-dependent communities); id. at 809 (noting that Greenpeace opposition to IFQs 
rests in part on the desire to “keep[] fisheries in the hands of small entrepreneurs”); 
SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at 87 (noting concerns in Icelandic fisheries about “the 
emergence of the relations of dependency associated with ‘fishing for others’ ”). 
 61. See, e.g., Evelyn Pinkerton & Danielle N. Edwards, The Elephant in the Room: The 
Hidden Costs of Leasing Individual Transferable Fishing Quotas, 33 MARINE POL’Y 707 (2009); 
B. Timothy Heinmiller, The Politics of “Cap and Trade” Policies, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 445, 
463–64 (2007) (reporting that the introduction of individual quotas in the U.S. surf 
clam/ocean quahog fishery has increased the incidence of absentee quota ownership); 
SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at 64 (noting that employment in the U.S. surf 
clam/ocean quahog fishery decreased after the introduction of catch shares) and 85 (noting 
increase in market concentration in the Icelandic herring fishery). 
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3. Resource Stewardship: Target and Non-Target Species 
In the 1950s, when Gordon and Scott called for the assignment of 
property rights in fisheries, stewardship, to the extent it was a concern at 
all, was strictly an aspect of the economic problem. Long-term sustainable 
yield of target species might be sufficiently valuable that it would justify 
restraint in short-term harvesting behavior. So long as fisheries remained 
open-access, however, no participant would have the economic incentive to 
exercise self-restraint. Property rights, by providing the promise of long-term 
security, could help fishery participants make the socially optimal trade-off 
between long and short-term economic gains.62 
Modern societies tend to take a broader view of resource stewardship, 
although the priority assigned to stewardship in relation to maximizing 
industry profitability certainly varies among nations. Sustainable long-term 
yield of target species remains the core of stewardship, but some societies 
also have a goal of protecting non-target resources, such as other fish species 
and, more broadly, marine ecosystems. Even where that is not an independent 
goal, fishery participants are more aware than they were fifty years ago of 
the linkages between target species and other ecosystem features, and  
therefore of the potential need to protect more than the target species.63  
Modern proponents of property rights-based fisheries management 
contend that secure property rights encourage greater concern for steward-
ship. Fishers who expect to have a long-term stake in the future of the 
fishery should be more interested in the fishery’s long-term health.64  
Furthermore, by removing pressure to race to capture the fish, catch shares 
should allow more careful fishing practices, helping to avoid overruns of the 
TAC and reducing bycatch and discards.65  
Conceptually, the position that property rights will increase incentives 
for stewardship is sometimes, but not always, compelling. If a stock is highly 
valuable but slow to reproduce, or if there is substantial risk that the future 
will reduce demand for the product, it will be economically rational for 
property rights holders to deliberately court a “boom-bust” cycle, or even to 
                                                                                                                      
 62. Gordon, supra note 1, at 141; Costello, Fisheries Collapse, supra note 25, at 1679. 
 63. In the United States, for example, Congress has explicitly recognized that “[o]ne 
of the greatest long-term threats to the viability of commercial and recreational fisheries is 
the continuing loss of marine, estuarine, and other aquatic habitats.” 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(9) 
(2006). 
 64. See, e.g., David Festa, Diane Regas & Justin Boomhower, Sharing the Catch,  
Conserving the Fish, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH., Winter 2008, at 75; Costello, Fisheries Collapse, 
supra note 25. 
 65. See supra text accompanying notes 48–52; Karol de Zwager Brown, Truce in the 
Salmon War: Alternatives for the Pacific Salmon Treaty, 74 WASH. L. REV. 605, 683–87 (1999). 
Doremus_Final_Web_Ready_FINAL_12May2013 7/18/2013  4:24 PM 
400 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 2:2 
 
knowingly extirpate a stock.66 Without an effective regulatory backstop, 
quota holders may also be tempted to “high-grade,” discarding less valuable 
(generally smaller) fish in order to fill their quota with the most marketable 
specimens.67 Finally, catch shares, like other cap-and-trade allocations but 
unlike property rights in land, typically are not guaranteed to be permanent.68 
To the extent that the issuer retains the prerogative to reduce or withdraw 
shares without compensation, catch shares will not provide firm incentives 
for sustainable practices.69 
The evidence that property rights have actually increased the health of 
fisheries remains limited. A 2008 study comparing the depleted status of 
fisheries with their use of a catch share approach offered tantalizing results. 
The comparison revealed that catch share fisheries were roughly half as 
likely as others to have collapsed and that the longer catch shares had been 
in use, the further from collapse the fishery tended to be.70 It is hard to tell, 
however, whether other features might explain those results. Catch share 
fisheries, for example, necessarily have a TAC. Not all fisheries are managed 
by TACs, and it might be that the imposition of a total catch limit is a more 
important driver in preventing collapse than how the TAC is divided 
among fishery participants.71 
Two more recent studies have tried to separate the effects of catch 
shares from other factors. They came to less enthusiastic conclusions. Both 
studies found little relationship between the use of catch shares and the 
                                                                                                                      
 66. Bromley, supra note 48, at 282; see also Sumaila, supra note 41. The whaling industry 
of the early- to mid-20th century showed both these characteristics. Not surprisingly, even 
in an industry with a small number of players and substantial barriers to entry, restraint was 
conspicuously missing. In that context, profit maximization calls for rapid exploitation, even 
if property rights are secure. C.W. Clark & R. Lamberson, An Economic History and Analysis 
of Pelagic Whaling, 6 MARINE POL’Y 103, 111–14 (1982). 
 67. See, e.g., Hsu & Wilen, supra note 38, at 809; SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at 
108–10. 
 68. See SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at 97 (“Most of the existing IFQ programs 
define the legal status of an IFQ as a ‘revocable privilege,’ not a permanent enfranchisement.”). 
In the United States, the law authorizing “limited access privilege programs,” as they are 
termed, specifically says that they may be revoked or modified at any time without compen-
sation. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(b)(2)–(3) (2006). 
 69. See, e.g., Ransom E. Davis, Individually Transferable Quotas and the Magnuson Act: 
Creating Economic Efficiency in Our Nation’s Fisheries, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 267, 308–
09 (1996). 
 70. Costello, Fisheries Collapse, supra note 25, at 1680. 
 71. Bromley, supra note 48, at 284; see also Patrick W. Gilmour et al., Beyond Individual 
Quotas: The Role of Trust and Cooperation in Promoting Stewardship of Five Australian Abalone 
Fisheries, 35 MARINE POL’Y 692, 692 (2011) (suggesting that factors other than catch shares 
might be responsible for the results reported by Costello et al.); Josh Nowlis & Arthur A. 
Van Benthem, Do Property Rights Lead to Sustainable Catch Increases?, 27 MARINE RESOURCE 
ECON. 89 (2012) (suggesting that improved monitoring and catch reporting could be a 
factor). 
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exploitation rate (proportion of biomass harvested) or population status.72 
The authors concluded that “many of the elements of the fishing system—
including the economic and social systems—that promoted overexploitation 
prior to catch shares largely persisted after catch shares were implemented.”73 
An earlier study of fisheries that converted to catch shares found that about 
two-thirds experienced at least temporary declines in stock levels.74 
There is also indirect evidence that catch shares reduce pressure on target 
species. The National Research Council, in a landmark 1999 study on indi-
vidual fishing quotas, found that catch share fisheries were less likely to 
exceed the regulatory TAC,75 presumably because fishing can be carried out 
more carefully and over a greater period of time. On the other hand, there 
is also evidence of “high-grading” in some fisheries.76 
There is little evidence on the question of whether catch share  
approaches affect stewardship of non-target resources. There are theoretical 
reasons both for optimism—because catch shares reduce economic incentives 
for wasteful practices, including some that increase bycatch—and for  
skepticism—because catch shares do nothing to produce a long-term profit 
incentive for preservation of resources that are not marketable. What  
evidence there is suggests that the answer is context-specific. In some cases, 
catch share fisheries seem roughly equivalent to those managed by conven-
tional regulation in terms of bycatch and discards.77 On the positive side of 
the ledger, in the Alaska halibut fishery, the elimination of derby fishing by 
an individual quota approach seems to have sharply decreased “ghost fishing” 
by lost or abandoned gear.78 On the negative side, environmentalists have 
complained that Alaska pollock quota holders have shown little concern for 
the status of the endangered Steller sea lion.79 
                                                                                                                      
 72. Timothy E. Essington et al., Catch Shares, Fisheries, and Ecological Stewardship: A 
Comparative Analysis of Resource Responses to a Rights-Based Policy Instrument, 5 
CONSERVATION LETTERS 186 (2012); Michael C. Melnychuk et al., Can Catch Share Fisheries 
Better Track Management Targets?, 13 FISH & FISHERIES 267 (2012). 
 73. Essington et al., supra note 72, at 193. 
 74. Tom Tietenberg, The Tradable-Permits Approach to Protecting the Commons: Lessons 
for Climate Change, 19 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 400, 405 (2003). 
 75. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at 35. 
 76. Id., at 108–10. 
 77. Id. at 36 (citing C.M. DEWEES & E. UEBER, EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT FISHERY 
MANAGEMENT SCHEMES ON BYCATCH, JOINT CATCH, AND DISCARDS: SUMMARY OF A 
NATIONAL WORKSHOP (Cal. Sea Grant Coll. Program, Report No. T-CSGCP-019, 1990)). 
 78. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at 3, 73–74. 
 79. Wyman, supra note 14, at 540. The decline of the western Alaska Steller sea lion 
population remains poorly understood, but one hypothesis is that the large-scale commercial 
fisheries in the region, including the highly valuable pollock fishery, could be taking such a 
large share of the sea lions’ prey that they are contributing to nutritional stress. For a  
detailed account of the controversy, see Beth C. Bryant, Adapting to Uncertainty: Law, Science, 
and Management in the Steller Sea Lion Controversy, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 171 (2009). 
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4. Conflict Reduction 
Another goal of management strategies may be to reduce conflict. 
There is some evidence from the pollution context that cap-and-trade  
approaches, especially combined with grandfathering, have reduced one 
specific brand of conflict, industry opposition to the imposition of emission 
caps.80 But that evidence is equivocal and difficult to interpret. Caps have 
often been set unrealistically high, 81 which makes them easy for industry to 
accept. And the industry view of caps depends heavily on the political 
context, which varies with the political strength of environmental advocates. 
Emphasizing a market-based approach, for example, did not get greenhouse 
gas emission reduction mandates through the U.S. Congress in 2009.82 
While industry clearly prefers a market approach (at least a lax market 
approach) to command-and-control regulation, it prefers no regulation at all 
to cap-and-trade. 
In the fisheries context, the primary discussion of conflict has focused 
on conflict between regulators and commercial fishers over TAC limits. 
There is a strong perception that the fishing industry has pushed constantly, 
and often successfully, for unrealistically high catch limits.83 Property rights 
proponents argue that property rights approaches can address this problem 
by reducing incentives for fishery participants to push for larger and larger 
allowable catches. The idea is that fishers who have a long-term stake in the 
fishery have less reason to resist short-term catch reductions imposed with 
the aim of increasing the prospects for long-term sustainability. Improving 
the profitability of fisheries can further reduce conflict by reducing the 
extent to which conservation regulations “are perceived as threats to livelihood 
and fishing cultures,”84 and therefore strenuously resisted.85 
                                                                                                                      
 80. See, e.g., Carol A. Casazza Herman et al., Breaking the Logjam: Environmental 
Reform for the New Congress and Administration, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 5 (2008); Thomas 
W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275, 297–98; Carol M. Rose, 
Hot Spots in the Legislative Climate Change Proposals, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 189, 192 (2008). 
 81. See Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade: Moving 
Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 410 (2009) (“The empirical evidence from 
existing cap-and-trade programs suggests that caps have not been very stringent. Rather, 
there has been a tendency in program design and implementation toward overallocating 
allowances.”). 
 82. See, e.g., H. Joseph Drapalski, The Viability of Interstate Collaboration in the Absence 
of Federal Climate Change Legislation, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 469, 470 (2011). 
 83. See, e.g., J.R. Beddington, D.J. Agnew & C.W. Clark, Current Problems in the 
Management of Marine Fisheries, 316 SCIENCE 1713, 1713 (2007) (“[O]vercapacity can, via the 
political process, lead to the erosion of management control.”). 
 84. Rod Fujita & Kate Bonzon, Right-Based Fisheries Management: An Environmentalist 
Perspective, 15 REVS. IN FISH BIOLOGY & FISHERIES 309, 310 (2005). 
 85. Id. Regulators who are less worried about causing bankruptcy and unemployment 
may also be more willing to set realistic catch limits. See R. Quentin Grafton et al., Incentive-
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I am not aware of any systematic comparison of conflicts over catch 
limits in fisheries with and without catch shares, but there are reports that 
holders of catch shares have lobbied for reductions in total catch,86 or have 
voluntarily kept harvests under the regulatory limit.87 Others, however, 
note that conflict and political maneuvering around TAC levels have not 
ended in fisheries managed by catch shares.88 
There are at least three reasons why catch share approaches do not  
necessarily reduce conflict over TACs. One is that fishery participants 
might have a higher discount rate than regulators, which would mean that 
fishers are, rationally, more interested in short- than long-term gains. That 
could be true if the fishers believe that short-term profits can be invested 
profitably,89 that if the current fishery collapses there will always be another 
one to which they can turn, or that their catch shares are likely to be limited 
or revoked in the future. Another possible explanation is psychological. In 
general, people are inclined to see the world as they would like it to be, 
interpreting equivocal or conflicting evidence in the way that most favors 
their interests.90 Fishers, therefore, will not necessarily accept that fisheries 
are declining just because scientists or regulators say they are. Holders of 
catch shares who genuinely believe their target species are not overfished 
will rationally push for higher TAC levels even if they seek a sustainable 
outcome. 
Catch share and other property rights approaches also create conflict 
over allocation of rights. In an open access fishery, no allocation decisions 
are required. Anyone who wants to can participate in the fishery; success is 
determined by the skill or luck of the fishers. Property rights strategies, by 
contrast, require political decisions about who will have access at what cost. 
Because industry participants are deeply invested in the outcome of these 
allocation decisions, they frequently become the subject of high-stakes 
                                                                                                                      
Based Approaches to Sustainable Fisheries, 63 CAN. J. FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCI. 699, 701 
(2006). 
 86. See, e.g., id. at 702. 
 87. See SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at 69–70 (reporting that pressure to  
increase the South Atlantic wreckfish TAC disappeared after individual quotas were intro-
duced and landings fell to less than 25% of the TAC); id. at 110 (giving other examples of 
“underfishing,” that is, catches below the TAC, in quota-managed fisheries). 
 88. Heinmiller, supra note 61, at 455. 
 89. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 90. See, e.g., Daniel Sarewitz, How Science Makes Environmental Controversies Worse, 7 
ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 385, 390–92 (2004); Naomi Oreskes, Science and Public Policy: What’s 
Proof Got to Do With It?, 7 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 369, 375 (2004); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., 
Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 258–59 (2000); 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 299, 304–
06 (2000). 
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political battles.91 Furthermore, participants with an emotional or cultural 
stake in the industry involved often demand limits on trading to protect the 
initial rights allocation.92 Small fishing enterprises, for example, may want 
assurances that large firms will not be able to buy up the entire quota. 
But demand for trading limits can go well beyond market share  
concerns. One of the economic arguments for tradable permits is that they 
allow environmentalists who want resources left unharvested or unsullied to 
put their money where their mouths are by buying and retiring use rights. 
Industry participants, however, tend to resist opening the market to conser-
vation interests. Property rights enthusiasts frequently point out that the 
U.S. acid rain market includes annual auctions in which environmental 
groups can purchase SO2 emission allowances for the purpose of retiring 
them.93 It’s important to realize, though, that the SO2 market is the exception 
rather than the rule. Even in that market, only a very small proportion of 
allowances are auctioned,94 and the environmental benefits of conservation 
purchases have been negligible.95  
In other contexts, industry participants have fiercely resisted the  
attempts of conservation interests to enter a resource allocation market. In 
the United States, for example, the federal government offers permits to 
graze livestock on federal lands. Conservationists seeking to acquire permits 
in ecologically sensitive locations for the purpose of removing livestock 
have come up against a statutory framework that does not allow them to do 
so.96 A similar dynamic has played out in other cap-and-trade contexts, 
where “[r]ather than quietly exiting production, some lower valued users 
resist trading their rights, often through political action seeking to preserve 
or erect barriers to free entitlement trading.”97 This is especially likely 
when, as is the case with fisheries, participants attach emotional or cultural, 
as well as monetary, value to the behavior in question.98 
                                                                                                                      
 91. See Heinmiller, supra note 61, at 456–61 (providing examples from cap and trade 
programs for water, fisheries, and greenhouse gases). 
 92. See Heinmiller, supra note 61, at 461–461. 
 93. See Jacob Kreutzer, Cap and Trade: A Behavioral Analysis of the Sulfur Dioxide 
Emissions Market, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 125, 129 (2006). 
 94. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651o(b) (2006) (requiring that EPA hold 2.8% of allowances for 
periodic auction). 
 95. Kreutzer, supra note 93, at 138. 
 96. See Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 167 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 1999), affirmed 529 U.S. 
728 (2000) (striking down regulation allowing issuance of conservation use permits); David 
G. Alderson, Buyouts and Conservation Permits: A Market Approach to Address the Federal Public 
Land Grazing Problem, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 903 (2005) (proposing statutory amendments 
to permit conservation use). 
 97. Heinmiller, supra note 61, at 451; see also Colby, supra note 54, at 644 (noting re-
sistance of agricultural interests to development of water markets in the western United States). 
 98. Heinmiller, supra note 61, at 461. 
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Another potential source of conflict is disagreement about the morality 
of the permitted behavior, or about the message that commodifying the 
behavior may send. One objection to trading of air pollution allowances in 
the United States has been that “turning pollution into a commodity to be 
bought and sold removes the moral stigma that is properly associated with 
it.”99 That concern has been answered primarily by pointing out that the 
“cap” in “cap-and-trade” limits the amount of pollution just as more tradi-
tional regulatory approaches do, and by efforts to clarify the costs cap-and-
trade systems impose on heavy polluters.100 Public opinion has not crystal-
lized around strong moral objections to trading in pollution rights, perhaps 
because there is general agreement that pollution cannot, as a practical 
matter, be completely eliminated. The strong moral objection will have real 
force, though, if a significant portion of the relevant population views the 
permitted activity as per se unacceptable. Most fishing does not carry the 
same ethical overtones as pollution but, as discussed in more detail below, 
the recent proposal for tradable whale harvest permits has brought this 
objection to markets to the fore.101  
A related objection, that tradable permits improperly privatize public 
resources, has more general force in the fisheries context because of the 
strong tradition of public ownership of fisheries in many nations. Even if 
environmentalists are allowed to participate in a resource market, if they 
regard the rights to a healthy resource as a public entitlement they will 
object to being expected to pay to ensure that entitlement is respected.102 
5. Fisheries Goals in the International Context 
Individual nations often have multiple goals for management of their 
fisheries. In the United States, legislatively declared goals remain primarily 
economic, focused on maximum long-term harvest by a robust domestic 
fishing industry. The federal Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act includes among its listed purposes promotion of domestic 
                                                                                                                      
 99. Michael J. Sandel, It’s Immoral to Buy the Right to Pollute, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997, 
at A23. 
 100. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution 
Allowances and the “Polluter Pays” Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 529–32 (2000) 
(rejecting the argument that commodifying pollution is immoral, but acknowledging that 
there may be “pedagogical” concerns about the message the public takes away from institution 
of trading schemes). 
 101. See infra Part III.A. 
 102. See Colby, supra note 54, at 645 (noting in the context of western U.S. water 
markets that “environmental advocates resent the fact that they must pay off irrigators in 
order to acquire water for ecosystem restoration”). 
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commercial and recreational fishing;103 maintaining the “optimum yield” from 
each fishery;104 and fully developing under-utilized domestic fisheries.105 
Economic efficiency, however, is not the only goal of U.S. fisheries 
management. All management measures must “consider” efficiency, but 
none can “have economic allocation as its sole purpose.”106 Ecological  
stewardship is an implicit goal. It is national policy to minimize bycatch107 
and to foster and maintain the diversity of fisheries.108 “Optimum yield” is 
defined as the harvest level which “will provide the greatest overall benefit 
to the Nation . . . taking into account the protection of marine ecosystems.”109 
Equitable allocation is also a goal. The Act’s purposes provision does not 
explicitly mention equitable allocation of the harvest, but it does note the 
special dependence of coastal areas on fishing110 and calls for consideration 
of the social and economic needs of states and their citizens.111 The national 
standards governing fishery management plans require that any allocation 
of fishing privileges be “fair and equitable to all [U.S.] fishermen,”112 and 
prevent excessive concentration of catch shares.113 Management measures 
are supposed to minimize adverse economic impacts on fishing communities 
to the extent practicable.114 
International fishery management goals are at least as diverse. The 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ratified by 
nearly all coastal nations,115 is the primary statement of international goals 
for ocean resource management. It explicitly endorses efficiency, equitable 
allocation, and ecological protection.116 UNCLOS declares the sovereign 
                                                                                                                      
 103. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(3)(2006). 
 104. Id. § 1801(b)(4). 
 105. Id. § 1801(b)(6). 
 106. Id. § 1851(a)(5). 
 107. Id. § 1801(c)(3). 
 108. Id. § 1801(c)(6). 
 109. Id. § 1802(33)(A). 
 110. Id. § 1801(a)(3). 
 111. Id. § 1801(b)(5), (c)(3). 
 112. Id. § 1851(a)(4)(A). 
 113. Id. § 1851(a)(4)(C). 
 114. Id. § 1851(a)(8). 
 115. The United States remains the conspicuous exception. Despite strong support 
from the administration, the military, the Chamber of Commerce, and former presidents of 
both political parties, ratification efforts fell short yet again in 2012. See Keith Johnson, GOP 
Scuttles Law-of-Sea Treaty, WALL ST. J. WASHINGTON WIRE (July 16, 2012, 5:06 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2012/07/16/gop-opposition-scuttles-law-of-sea-treaty/; 
Stewart M. Patrick, (Almost) Everyone Agrees: The U.S. Should Ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty, 
ATLANTIC (June 10, 2012, 7:21 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/ 
06/-almost-everyone-agrees-the-us-should-ratify-the-law-of-the-sea-treaty/258301/. 
 116. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397, pmbl. [hereinafter UNCLOS], available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_ 
agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf (parties recognize the desirability of establishing a 
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rights of coastal nations to exploit the resources of their EEZ,117 but qualifies 
those rights with duties to consider the economic needs of coastal fishing 
communities118 and to maintain the populations of both target and non-
target species.119 Despite the nods to ecological goals, the objective of max-
imum sustainable yield retains primacy. The management target for living 
resources is described as “optimum utilization;”120 coastal states without 
sufficient domestic capacity to harvest the total allowable catch must allow 
other states access to the “surplus.”121 UNCLOS maintains the traditional 
rights of all nations to fish on the high seas,122 subject to a duty to cooperate 
in developing measures to conserve both target and non-target species.123 
Conflict reduction is not an explicit goal of either U.S. fisheries law or 
UNCLOS, but it is implicit in most resource management regimes. As 
noted earlier, conflict over quota allocation is a common feature of domestic 
cap-and-trade strategies. Conflicting views of fairness and the voluntary 
nature of international law make allocation conflicts both sharper and more 
significant in the international context.  
The conflicts are sharper because the extent and intensity of disagree-
ment tends to be greater. Differing contexts, histories and cultures mean 
that nations and their peoples take very different views of what constitutes 
a fair distribution of resources. The challenges of negotiating the Kyoto 
Protocol on greenhouse gas emissions and the so-far fruitless search for a 
successor agreement illustrate the depth of these differences, and the diffi-
culty of bridging them. The Kyoto Protocol adopted emission reduction 
targets based on past emissions for industrialized nations. It imposed no 
limits on emissions by developing countries. Each side of this divide objected 
to the way the other sides’ obligations (or lack thereof) were calculated.124 
Developing nations took the view that it would be unfair to restrict their 
development progress given their low past emissions. The United States 
took a very different view, refusing to ratify the Protocol largely on the 
ground that the exemption of rapidly developing countries like China and 
                                                                                                                      
legal order which will promote “the equitable and efficient utilization of [marine] resources, 
the conservation of [marine] living resources, and the study, protection and preservation of 
the marine environment”). 
 117. Id. at Art. 56(1)(a). 
 118. Id. at Art. 61(2). 
 119. Id. at Art. 61(4). 
 120. Id. at Art. 62(1). 
 121. Id. at Art. 62(2). 
 122. Id. at Art. 116. 
 123. Id. at Arts. 117–120. 
 124. See, e.g., Paul Baer, Equity, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Global Common Resources, 
in CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A SURVEY 393, 394 (Stephen H. Schneider et al. eds., 2002); 
Michael Grubb, The Economics of the Kyoto Protocol, 4 WORLD ECON. 143, 145 (2003). 
Doremus_Final_Web_Ready_FINAL_12May2013 7/18/2013  4:24 PM 
408 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 2:2 
 
India was unfair to their economic competitors.125 The search for an allocation 
scheme acceptable to all the major players continues to dog negotiations 
over a successor treaty.126 The populous developing nations urge a per capita 
allocation system,127 but that approach is unlikely to prove acceptable to the 
United States.128 
Fishery catch share programs don’t arouse the same level of allocation 
conflict as greenhouse gas emissions because they have much smaller  
economic and social impacts. Nonetheless, there are very real divisions 
between developed and developing nations, coastal and landlocked nations, 
and nations with established as opposed to new fishing fleets about how 
ocean resources should be fairly divided. 
Differing views about fairness are especially problematic in the interna-
tional context because of the need for voluntary commitments. Within 
nations, distributive conflicts of this sort can certainly be uncomfortable, 
and can delay or soften action, but there are at least mechanisms for over-
coming the objections of a minority if the majority can muster sufficient 
political will. The politics of creating property rights systems are daunting 
in the domestic context;129 they are even more so in the international 
sphere. There is no international law procedure for overriding the objections 
of sovereign nations, even if the will to do so exists. They are free to remain 
outside any agreement, as the United States has remained outside 
UNCLOS and the Kyoto Protocol. That makes negotiating international 
agreements among nations with very different interests and value systems 
extraordinarily challenging.  
Catch shares, which cannot be introduced without resolving both the 
initial allocation issue and issues of subsequent transferability, bring that 
challenge squarely front and center. If an agreement can be reached at all, 
the unwillingness or inability to confront difficult allocation questions is 
likely to bring in through the back door the pressure on TACs that catch 
share programs are supposed to reduce. 
                                                                                                                      
 125. Baer, supra note 124, at 394. 
 126. Norichika Kanie et al., Allocation and Architecture in Climate Governance Beyond 
Kyoto: Lessons from Interdisciplinary Research on Target Setting, 10 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS 
299, 300-01 (2010). 
 127. See Eric A. Posner and Cass A. Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be Allocated 
on a Per Capita Basis?, 97 CAL. L. REV. 51, 53 n.6 (2009) (collecting sources). 
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BODANSKY, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE EFFORTS 
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B. Information and Trust 
The major source of conflict in domestic fisheries regulated by conven-
tional management methods has been over the details of regulatory 
conservation measures. A TAC is often the primary such measure; it may 
be replaced or supplemented by seasonal or geographic closures and gear 
restrictions. Conservation measures are the focus of persistent and intense 
conflict in many fisheries. 
Because information is often limited and equivocal, setting conservation 
measures is a difficult technical challenge, one that leaves plenty of room 
for argument.130 Just as cap-and-trade pollution programs do not eliminate 
the challenge of determining the acceptable pollution level, catch share and 
other rights-based fishery programs do not remove the technical problem of 
setting a TAC.131 Rights-based fisheries may also require other regulatory 
measures, such as seasonal or area closures, since both the biological impact 
and the economic value of harvest may vary with time and place.132  
The evidence supporting regulatory measures for specific fisheries is 
often fraught with uncertainty.133 To complicate matters further, the multiple 
elements of that uncertainty are difficult to identify, much less quantify. 
Fishery managers are only beginning to systematically take on that task.134 
For the moment, not only is there much managers don’t know about the 
fisheries they are in charge of, they often do not know how much they don’t 
know. 
High, and uncertain, levels of uncertainty about sustainable catch levels 
or the need for other management measures foster overly optimistic think-
ing,135 invoking a phenomenon psychologists call “motivated reasoning.” 
People selectively interpret information and access memories and beliefs in 
ways that lead to their desired conclusion.136 This process can influence the 
interpretation of scientific evidence. People are more critical of studies they 
                                                                                                                      
 130. See, e.g., GEORGE LAPOINTE ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, COUNTING FISH 
101: AN ANALYSIS OF FISH STOCK ASSESSMENTS (2012), available at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/report/2012/09/27/39347/counting-fish-101/. 
 131. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 49, at 107. 
 132. Robert T. Deacon et al., Improving Efficiency by Assigning Harvest Rights to Fishery 
Cooperatives: Evidence from the Chignik Salmon Co-op, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 479, 504–05 (2008). 
 133. See, e.g., R. Ian Perry et al., A Framework for Providing Scientific Advice for the 
Management of New and Developing Invertebrate Fisheries, 9 REV. FISH BIOLOGY & FISHERIES 
125, 130 (1999) (noting the “potential for large errors” in the stock estimates needed to 
support TAC determinations “and the relatively high cost of reducing these errors”). 
 134. See Stephen Ralston et al., A Meta-Analytic Approach to Quantifying Scientific 
Uncertainty in Stock Assessments, 109 FISHERY BULL. 217 (2011). 
 135. Ezra M. Markowitz & Azim F. Shariff, Climate Change and Moral Judgment, 2 
NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 243, 244 (2012). 
 136. Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 483 
(1990). 
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are motivated to disbelieve.137 Motivated reasoning is not intentional;  
desires influence conclusions even when people intend to objectively evaluate 
the evidence, and sincerely believe they are doing so.138 Evidence perceived 
as sufficiently strong can force people into uncomfortable conclusions. But 
motivated reasoners may never get to the point of recognizing even a robust 
scientific consensus, because people tend to look harder for information 
supporting their beliefs and to place greater trust in the expertise of others 
who share their worldviews.139 
Motivated reasoning is quite likely to operate in the fishery management 
context. Fishery participants with powerful emotional and financial ties to 
their occupation will be strongly motivated to believe the fishery is healthy, 
and that conservation measures that would reduce their harvest or increase 
their costs are not necessary. High levels of uncertainty in the data will 
exacerbate the tendency of fishery participants to see it in the most optimistic 
light.140 Although this insight is supported by theoretical and experimental 
psychology, it is really just common sense. Resource users who don’t believe 
the resource is under threat will not happily reduce their use, even if they 
hold secure property rights.141  
Catch shares might reduce the motivation for that belief somewhat by 
lengthening fishers’ time horizons or reducing financial strain, but they will 
not eliminate motivated reasoning. Larger TACs and fewer other conserva-
tion measures are going to look better to fishery participants with or 
without catch shares. That catch share holders might genuinely desire to 
maintain a sustainable fishery will not protect them against unconsciously 
interpreting ambiguous or conflicting stock assessments as supporting a 
large catch. 
Distrust of the scientists who provide technical information about the 
status of the fishery, or of the regulators charged with determining what 
consequences follow, will exacerbate the dynamic of doubt. This phenomenon 
is already observable in domestic fisheries, where regulators have tended to 
set TACs at or even above the high end of the uncertainty range offered by 
                                                                                                                      
 137. Id. at 489–90. 
 138. Indeed, reminding people of the importance of objectivity can actually reinforce 
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their technical advisors.142 It seems likely to be worse in the international 
context, where fishery participants are further removed, politically and 
culturally, from those they are being asked to trust, and where the participants 
distrust not just the regulators but each other. 
Together, conflicting goals and heightened distrust make specifying 
conservation measures even more of a challenge in international than in 
domestic fisheries. In the early years of its existence, for example, the 
Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), a 
regional fishery management organization, regularly failed to reach agreement 
on a TAC. Finally, after a ten-year, multi-million dollar development  
process, the CCSBT adopted a process for setting TACs that does not 
require annual negotiation.143 
C. Administration and Enforcement 
The third challenge for catch share programs is their dependence on  
effective administration, monitoring, and enforcement. This problem is not 
unique to a catch share strategy, of course. Conventional fishery management 
also carries administrative costs and requires monitoring and enforcement 
efforts. But property rights strategies impose some unique challenges, 
which are magnified in the international context. 
As explained above, conventional fishery management requires the  
development, imposition, and enforcement of a TAC and other measures 
such as gear limits, area closures, and seasonal restrictions. Shifting to a 
catch share strategy does not eliminate the need for these difficult and 
controversial technical decisions. Instead, property rights-based fishery 
management actually adds a new administrative dimension. Regulators 
must be able to track ownership of quota shares, monitor individual catch, 
and compare catch to share holdings. The administrative tasks are particularly 
complex in multispecies fisheries, leading some observers to argue that 
catch shares are impractical in the multispecies context.144 
Beyond setting conservation measures, enforcing them has long been a 
significant problem in many fisheries, because harvest activities occur over 
large and often remote geographic areas and landings and sales can be difficult 
to track through decentralized and informal markets. Moving to catch 
                                                                                                                      
 142. Josh Eagle & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Answering Lord Perry’s Question: Dissecting 
Regulatory Overfishing, 46 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 649 (2003). 
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shares does not remove the enforcement challenges.145 Enforcement problems 
are common, even in developed nations146 and even in catch share fisheries.147 
In some fisheries, catch shares may even increase the costs of enforcement 
because they make longer seasons possible148 and provide incentives for 
high-grading.149 “Quota busting,” illegal harvest in excess of quota shares 
owned, can be extensive.150 This is not surprising. Shifting to catch shares 
reduces the number of individuals with a legal right to fish; those left out of 
the system, if they lack other options, will be motivated to continue fishing 
illegally.  
Because of this dynamic, increased monitoring of catch and landings 
has been necessary following a shift to catch shares in some fisheries.151 
New Zealand and Iceland, where catch share approaches are widespread, 
have among the highest per vessel fisheries management costs.152 Increased 
enforcement costs need not be an insurmountable problem, however. In 
theory, at least, they can be financed from the increased profitability of the 
fishery.153 
Enforcement is, institutionally as well as practically, especially difficult 
in international fisheries. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU)  
fishing within EEZs and on the high seas is a major obstacle to developing 
sustainable global fisheries.154 IUU fishing encompasses both fishing that 
contravenes applicable regulations and fishing that is entirely outside the 
regulatory system.155 It “has proved stubbornly resistant to recent interna-
tional attempts to control it.”156  
Institutionally, IUU fishing is facilitated by systematic gaps in the  
international fisheries regulatory regime. On the high seas (those areas that 
lie outside national EEZs), fisheries are regulated, if at all, by regional 
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fishery management organizations (RFMOs). Nations that do not voluntarily 
become parties to these organizations are not legally subject to their conser-
vation measures. 
Even nations that are members of RFMOs do not always vigorously 
implement their provisions.157 It is difficult to control fishing by or under 
the auspices of rogue nations because UNCLOS generally gives the flag 
state exclusive jurisdiction over ships on the high seas.158 Multilateral 
agreements can expand inspection authority, but only with respect to  
nations that choose to join those agreements.159 Several notorious “flag of 
convenience” states refuse to sign on. This allows large-scale vessels bearing 
their flag to fish legally without regulation, ignoring conservation 
measures,160 even though they may be owned by nationals of parties to the 
relevant agreements.161 
Practically, the economic rewards of IUU fishing swamp the resources 
available for enforcement. “IUU fishing is a high reward, low risk activity.”162 
Fish are a valuable commodity in global markets. Enforcing fishery regula-
tions is costly163 because harvests occur over wide areas, and illegally caught 
fish can be disguised by processing or mixed with legal catch without much 
risk of detection. In less developed countries, management and enforcement 
resources are simply unavailable. Even in wealthy nations, fishery manage-
ment and enforcement often do not get the resources they need because 
they are not seen as high priorities.164 Furthermore, IUU fishing activities 
often cross national borders; fish caught illegally on the high seas may be 
trans-shipped in one nation’s territory and sold in the markets of one or 
more other nations. Detecting and punishing those activities requires that 
authorities in all the relevant nations have the technical means and the 
willingness to share data in real time. Institutional frameworks for that 
sharing have proven elusive.165 Finally, the penalties for IUU fishing, which 
UNCLOS limits to fines rather than imprisonment for activities occurring 
beyond any nation’s territorial sea, may not provide adequate deterrence,166 
especially in light of the low probability of apprehension. Ironically, the 
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 158. UNCLOS, supra note 116, art. 92(1). 
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IUU problem has been made worse by the adoption of catch share programs 
within EEZs. By reducing fleet capacity in domestic waters, as they are 
designed to do, those programs have pushed excluded vessels onto the high 
seas.167 
III. NOT EVERY PROBLEM IS A NAIL 
The previous Section demonstrated that catch share approaches can  
effectively serve some goals in some places, but are less well suited to other 
goals and other contexts. Of course, the question is never whether property 
rights approaches would function perfectly, but how they stack up against 
possible alternatives. Even if catch shares have serious problems, they might 
still be the best available choice. Determining that requires context-
sensitive consideration of the specific problem being targeted. At minimum, 
however, it should not be blithely assumed that every fishery problem is 
best solved by a property rights approach.  
Closer examination of two recent proposals for adoption of property 
rights strategies for global fisheries provides concrete examples of two ways 
such approaches can fall short. The first, the proposal for tradable whale 
harvest permits, simply does not connect with the essence of the problem. 
Rather than a solution to the gridlock plaguing the Whaling Convention, it 
is a distraction, diverting attention from the fundamental reasons for that 
gridlock. The second, dealing with southern bluefin tuna, is a situation in 
which property rights are a more conceptually appropriate solution, but 
their application presents substantial practical difficulties which are likely 
to be common in the international context. 
A. Tradable Whale Permits 
Recently in the high-profile journal Nature, economist Christopher 
Costello and ecologists Steven Gaines and Leah Gerber proposed the  
introduction of tradable whale hunting permits.168 Their focus on tradable 
permits (essentially catch shares for whales) is understandable, but off target. 
In order to understand why tradable permits won’t solve the whaling problem, 
we must briefly review the history of international whaling regulation. 
Whales were one of the first ocean resources to arouse international 
concern. By the late nineteenth century, technological advancements includ-
                                                                                                                      
 167. Id. at 49. 
 168. Costello, Market Approach, supra note 33. These authors are not the first to suggest 
a tradable whale quota system, but their proposal has gotten the most attention. Earlier 
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Doremus_Final_Web_Ready_FINAL_12May2013 7/18/2013  4:24 PM 
Spring 2013] Why International Catch Shares Won’t Save Ocean Biodiversity 415 
 
ing steamships and explosive harpoons had sparked a global whale rush that 
threatened several species with extinction.169 A few whaling nations intro-
duced domestic restrictions, and attempts to craft an international 
agreement limiting whaling began early in the twentieth century.170 By the 
late 1930s, some but not all of the largest whaling nations had agreed to 
size, species, and area restrictions.171 Continued unsustainable pressure on 
whale stocks finally led to negotiation of the Whaling Convention,172 which 
took effect in 1948. 
At its origin, the Whaling Convention was aimed at sustainable exploi-
tation, not preservation.173 In its first quarter century, it failed miserably at 
that aim. By the early 1970s, whale stocks were crashing as the nascent 
environmental movement raised global concern.174 In 1972, the United 
Nations Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment called for a 
whaling moratorium.175 The United States, which had decided to end  
domestic commercial whaling, proposed a moratorium in subsequent meet-
ings of the International Whaling Commission (IWC), the regulatory body 
established by the Whaling Convention.176 The IWC rejected the proposal.177  
The Whaling Convention, however, had sowed the seeds of a radical 
change in institutional direction when it structured the IWC to give each 
member nation one vote178 and invited any nation to join.179 Whaling oppo-
nents mounted a campaign in the late 1970s to recruit non-whaling states to 
sign on to the Whaling Convention.180 Environmental nongovernmental 
organizations such as Greenpeace were actively engaged in this campaign; 
their pitch was not that whaling was at unsustainable levels, but that it was 
“morally repugnant.”181 By 1982, enough non-whaling nations had signed on 
                                                                                                                      
 169. Gerry J. Nagtzaam, The International Whaling Commission and the Elusive Great 
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 172. See ICRW, supra note 10. 
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to the Whaling Convention to tip the balance. The IWC adopted a morato-
rium on commercial whaling, effective in 1986.182 
The moratorium has been hotly debated since its adoption. Although 
the rhetorical battle has been largely fought in scientific terms, it remains 
grounded in the moral intuitions that originally motivated the moratorium.183 
Within the IWC, whaling opponents have strategically couched their objec-
tions in terms of sustainable harvest.184 This sort of dissonance between 
motives and rhetoric is familiar in environmental conflicts. Science has long 
struck environmentalists as a sounder political ground for their arguments 
than ethics,185 so that underlying moral objections are often submerged in 
the formal debate. Moreover, the Whaling Convention itself requires scien-
tific rhetoric, since it mandates that IWC regulations “be based on scientific 
findings.”186 The result is a classic “science charade;”187 both supporters and 
opponents of the moratorium couch their dispute in scientific terms, hiding 
the persistent value differences that divide them. At the Stockholm Confer-
ence, for example, when Japan objected that a whaling moratorium was not 
scientifically justified, anti-whaling nations asserted that their scientists said 
otherwise.188 When it finally adopted the moratorium, the IWC promised 
that the data supporting it would be continuously reviewed, and suggested 
that it would remain in place only as long as the science justified it.189 
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(2007). 
 189. “This provision will be kept under review, based upon the best scientific advice, 
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Rather than ending whaling, the moratorium, which is “riddled with 
loopholes and exceptions,”190 has made whaling more difficult for the inter-
national community to regulate.191 Norway, which took an exception to the 
moratorium and therefore is not legally bound by it, openly engages in 
commercial whaling.192 Iceland briefly left the Whaling Convention only to 
return subject to an exception to the moratorium. Like Norway, it has  
resumed commercial whaling.193 Japan makes extensive use of the scientific 
research exception in the Whaling Convention.194 
Whaling has become a perennial source of international controversy, 
and a flashpoint for friction between otherwise allied nations.195 The conflict 
is not confined to diplomatic arenas. Sea Shepherd, a nongovernmental 
organization which describes itself as “the most aggressive and most  
successful whale-saving organization in the world,”196 actively confronts 
whalers at sea, going so far as to ram or attempt to disable their vessels.197 
Sea Shepherd has lost some of its own boats through these tactics,198 which 
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United States Relating to International Law, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 431, 435–36 n.4 (1985) (repro-
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Balton, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Oceans and Int’l Envtl. and Scientific Affairs, 
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 196. The History of Sea Shepherd Conservation Society and Whaling, SEA 
SHEPHERD CONSERVATION SOC’Y, http://www.seashepherd.org/whales/sea-shepherd-
history.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2012). 
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 198. Editorial, Whales for Sale, 481 NATURE 114 (2012). 
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have drawn charges of piracy.199 In 2011, however, Sea Shepherd succeeded 
in forcing the Japanese fleet to end its research whaling season early.200 
Entrenched positions on both sides have left the IWC “mired in a  
prolonged stalemate.”201 Whaling proponents have adopted the strategy 
that worked so well for the other side in the 1980s, recruiting their own 
allies to join the IWC.202 The moratorium remains in place, but perpetually 
contested. The situation has undermined respect for the IWC, which is now 
widely regarded as both ineffectual and dysfunctional. 
Costello and his coauthors offer tradable whale catch shares, which they 
term “whale shares,” as a solution to the IWC crisis.203 They propose that 
“ ‘whale shares’ would be allocated in sustainable numbers to all member 
nations of the IWC, who would have the choice of exercising them, leaving 
them unused for a year or retiring them in perpetuity.” 204 Whale shares 
would be tradable in a global market.205 Costello et al. assert that their 
tradable permit proposal “stands a good chance of being acceptable both to 
anti- and to pro-whaling constituents.”206 
In light of the current dysfunction of the IWC, no possibility should be 
dismissed out of hand. The whale shares prescription, however, is highly 
unlikely to improve the health of the IWC.207 Putting aside for the moment 
the fact that it would require renegotiation of the Whaling Convention,208 a 
barrier that is likely insurmountable, it simply does not match the problem. 
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Doremus_Final_Web_Ready_FINAL_12May2013 7/18/2013  4:24 PM 
Spring 2013] Why International Catch Shares Won’t Save Ocean Biodiversity 419 
 
Catch shares are primarily good at reducing overcapacity, increasing the 
profitability and economic efficiency of fisheries. Overcapacity and ineffi-
ciency are not the cause of the IWC’s gridlock. Instead, the gridlock follows 
directly from the divergent, deeply held values of the parties. A tradable 
quota system would not address that conflict.  
The whale share proposal would not break the existing gridlock because 
it would provide little advantage to those most deeply invested in the issue. 
The proposal’s authors are naïve to expect either side of the conflict would 
back their proposal. The whaling nations will not like the idea because they 
are deeply invested in their continuing right to whale, not primarily as an 
economic matter but as a cultural one.209 Whaling has become a marker for 
their sovereign right to self-determination.210 Whaling restrictions are seen 
both as objectionable in their own right and also as a potential harbinger of 
inroads on other fishing rights.211  
The whaling nations are not likely to endorse a system that requires 
them to share the initial allocation of quota with nations lacking any history 
of whaling, and even with nations deeply opposed to whaling.212 They would 
also undoubtedly strongly resist a trading system open to conservation 
interests, because it would undermine what they see as the purpose of the 
IWC, facilitating development of a sustainable whaling industry.213 
Costello et al. do not explain why they think whale shares would be  
attractive to whaling nations. They note that a similar proposal floated 
before adoption of the moratorium went nowhere, and they speculate that it 
might have been ahead of its time or doomed by the fact that permits would 
have been auctioned rather than allocated without charge.214 Although the 
idea will be familiar this time, it still will not offer any substantial  
advantage over the current situation to whaling nations. They would get 
their shares for free, but would still have to buy shares from other nations if 
they wanted to harvest the full sustainable quota.  
One might argue that the whaling nations face a different situation 
now, with the moratorium in effect, than they did when the earlier proposal 
was made. In fact, however, the moratorium has relatively little effect on 
whaling nations given the availability of objections and the research exemp-
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tion. It is not clear that their whale harvest would increase under the whale 
share proposal. Indeed, to the extent that the whaling nations think IWC 
quota decisions will be tainted by political pressures from anti-whaling na-
tions, they might well prefer not to return to whaling under IWC regulation. 
Alternatively, one could argue that the whaling nations currently escape 
the moratorium only at the cost of international condemnation. It’s not 
clear, however, that catch shares would change that dynamic, to the extent it 
exists. As explained below, catch shares would not change the views of those 
most opposed to whaling, or their attempts to bring global public pressures 
to bear. As for other nations, in fact, continued whaling since adoption of 
the moratorium has brought few consequences. In the United States, the 
Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967215 and the 
Packwood Amendment to the Magnuson-Stevens Conservation Act216 
require that the Secretary of Commerce identify foreign fishing operations 
which diminish the effectiveness of the Whaling Convention. Such nations 
must be denied access to fishing in U.S. waters, and may be subject to trade 
sanctions.217 No sanctions have ever been imposed under these amend-
ments, however, and threats of sanctions in recent years have had little 
effect.218 International pressure seems unlikely to provide a strong motivation 
for the whaling nations to endorse whale shares. 
Opponents of whaling are equally unlikely to find whale shares attractive. 
Those who view whaling as a moral wrong will not be mollified by intro-
duction of a whale share market, even if they are allowed to participate. 
Costello et al. suggest that Sea Shepherd ought to support a market because 
it could save money by turning from its present campaign of harassment of 
whaling ships to the purchase of whale shares.219 That suggestion shows just 
how little thought these authors have given to the activists’ goals or psy-
chology. Anti-whaling activists are not going to change their tactics based 
on an analysis of the dollar cost per whale life saved. They are committed to 
convincing the world that whaling is morally unacceptable. The IWC mora-
torium, even with its loopholes, sends that message, which can be amplified 
by dramatic anti-whaling harassment campaigns. A whale permit trading 
system would send the very different message that whaling is acceptable 
within limits. Expecting Sea Shepherd to support a whale share market is 
like expecting anti-abortion activists to welcome a market in abortion permits. 
Conflicts grounded in fundamentally divergent moral views cannot be solved 
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by the introduction of markets, and the whaling moratorium controversy is 
precisely that sort of conflict.  
Even if that value conflict could be overcome, setting a sustainable and 
politically acceptable TAC would remain problematic under a catch share 
approach. One major driver of the moratorium was the IWC’s history of 
authorizing unsustainable harvests. The latest whale share proposal would 
not reduce the pressure for high TACs. It calls for shares to have a short 
life, on the order of ten years.220 That is not likely to be long enough to 
encourage economic whalers to prefer sustainable harvests. Even permanent 
catch shares probably would not have that effect; whale fisheries have long 
been held up as the paradigmatic example of a context in which even those 
holding permanent property rights could rationally prefer a “boom-and-
bust” approach.221 The whale shares proposal might even exacerbate the 
pressure for high TACs, since quota would offer a potential economic windfall 
to Whaling Convention members that have never before had a financial stake. 
Another problem for the IWC has been credible enforcement. It has 
always relied on voluntary enforcement by the parties,222 who have not been 
strongly motivated to comply. Before the moratorium, even the unrealisti-
cally high TACs were routinely exceeded.223 The United States has played a 
backup enforcement role through its willingness to threaten trade sanctions 
against nations whose whaling undermines the effectiveness of the IWC.224 
That threat, however, has become less credible, and less effective, over 
time.225 Concerns about the effectiveness of enforcement have provided one 
significant ground for objections to lifting the moratorium.226 Moving to a 
catch share approach would further complicate enforcement efforts by 
diffusing responsibility. It would be difficult to blame any particular nation 
for the failure of whalers who buy shares on the open market to adhere to 
their share limits. That difficulty would be magnified if share ownership 
were open to vessels flying flags of nonparties. 
In sum, a catch share approach is not likely to offer much benefit to the 
IWC. It would not solve the core dispute, borne of differing values and 
cultures, over whether harvesting whales is ethically permissible and if so 
under what circumstances. Nor would a catch share approach reduce the key 
technical and practical barriers to setting and implementing sustainable 
whale quotas. It would, however, pose new and difficult questions about 
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how quota should be divided, who could participate in the market, and who 
would be responsible for assuring that both official market players and 
others abide by the quota limits. Arguing about those questions would be an 
unhelpful distraction from addressing the very real problems of the IWC. 
There is no easy answer to those problems. Pretending (or hoping) that 
catch shares will provide one will simply facilitate further avoidance of the 
root causes of the conflict. 
B. Bluefin Tuna Management 
The bluefin tuna is a wonder of nature—large, fast, long-lived and 
beautiful. As marine scientist Carl Safina puts it: 
The bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus) is a creature of superlatives. 
Growing to 1500 pounds (700 kilos), traveling on trans-oceanic  
migrations, and reputedly capable of swimming 50 miles (90 km) 
per hour, it is one of the largest, most wide-ranging and fastest of 
animals. To anyone who has seen this saber-finned giant explode 
through the surface of the sea, it is among the most magnificent.227 
It is also exceptionally valuable; early in 2012, a single bluefin sold at auction 
in Tokyo for $736,000, or well over $1200 per pound.228 Not surprisingly, 
fishing pressure on the bluefin has been intense, resulting in steep popula-
tion declines. Two of the three bluefin species, the Atlantic bluefin and the 
southern bluefin, are at high risk of extinction.229 In 2010, the United States 
unsuccessfully sought a ban on international trade in Atlantic bluefin 
through the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species.230  
Because bluefin are highly migratory, their management requires inter-
national cooperation. Tuna are managed by five RMFOs; the Atlantic 
bluefin is under the jurisdiction of the International Commission for the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), while the southern bluefin is 
managed by both the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) and by the 
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Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT). 
Each sets a TAC for bluefin catch within its jurisdiction, and allocates that 
total catch among its parties and cooperating nonparties.  
The current paradigm is widely recognized as an international failure. 
Recent performance reviews of the three RFMOs responsible for bluefin 
management have been highly critical. All three suffer from difficulties 
setting TACs, including reluctance to accept the advice of scientific advisors. 
They also have all had trouble allocating the TAC among parties and coop-
erating nonparties, monitoring compliance with the TAC, and controlling 
IUU fishing.231  
Frustration with the current state of bluefin management has produced 
a range of proposals, including tradable quotas. A thoughtful student note 
has argued that, while not without difficulties, a catch shares approach to 
Atlantic bluefin management would significantly improve conservation 
outcomes.232 An observer of the IOTC’s struggle to develop a viable quota 
allocation system does not go so far as to advocate an international catch 
share scheme, but does note that “[t]echnical advice as to what management 
regime for international tuna fisheries is best or most effective does seem to 
be moving towards a concept of rights based management involving trans-
ferable quotas.”233 
Unfortunately, catch shares are unlikely to improve the lot of the bluefin 
or its ecosystem because the catch share solution is not well-suited to the 
bluefin overfishing problem. First, as detailed above, what catch shares do 
best is reduce over-capacity, where there is broad recognition that over-
capacity is a problem and willingness to let the market decide the identity 
of fishery participants. Over-capacity is a problem in bluefin fisheries,234 
but with a unique twist. In some areas, longline fishing for swordfish and 
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other tuna produces bluefin bycatch.235 This bycatch is difficult to predict or 
control, especially on an individual boat basis, so it would be difficult for 
participants in those other fisheries to acquire the necessary catch shares. 
There also are operators in other fisheries who target bluefin opportunisti-
cally; given its great value, bluefin is a kind of lottery fish offering the 
potential for an occasional high payoff.236 Additionally there are charter 
operators and recreational fishermen who target bluefin among other species, 
but cannot easily predict the likelihood of one or more catches in a particular 
year. That adds another dimension to allocation disputes, and indeed recrea-
tional fishermen have been among the fiercest opponents of proposals for a 
U.S. domestic bluefin catch share program.237 
Second, the economics of the bluefin fishery do not create incentives 
for long-term sustainable fisheries. With big fish carrying six-figure price 
tags and the species already dwindling, fishers might rationally conclude 
that their best strategy is to get what they can while they can. Tuna-fishing 
nations seem to have been pursuing that strategy, constantly pushing for 
higher quotas, within the framework of the RFMOs. Catch share fisheries 
still require TACs, which would still have to be set by the RFMOs, which 
so far have proven unwilling or unable to follow the advice of their own 
scientists. 
Third, catch share approaches are already possible in the bluefin fishery 
at a domestic level, as they are for many fisheries managed by RFMOs. The 
tuna RFMOs allocate the total allowable catch among parties and cooperating 
nonparties. Quota-holding nations are, with some restrictions on transfer to 
other nations, free to allocate their share of the catch as they see fit.  
Australia has used a catch share program to allocate its southern bluefin 
tuna quota since 1984.238 Some of the Australian catch shares are leased by 
Japanese vessels.239 The United States is considering a catch share program 
for its quota of Atlantic bluefin.240 The benefits of catch shares, in other 
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words, are already available in the bluefin fishery, through domestic regula-
tion. At least some of those shares are available on a transnational market. 
It seems unlikely that an international trading scheme would add suffi-
cient conservation benefits to offset the transaction costs of creating it. 
Developing nations with artisanal fisheries would surely oppose such a 
scheme, because it would almost certainly end up concentrating quota in the 
hands of distant water fishing fleets from wealthy nations. Nations with 
significant recreational fisheries might also be opposed to a universal trading 
system. There would be little benefit for conservation interests. Even if 
trading were open to them, quota prices would likely be too high to be 
attractive. Even the most ardent conservationist would likely balk at spending 
hundreds of thousands of dollars to save a single fish.  
Fourth, trading would not address the many technical challenges of 
bluefin management. Bluefin fishing would still have to be overseen in a 
spatially explicit, and complex, way. Geography matters in the bluefin fishery, 
in ways that remain poorly understood. There is considerable uncertainty 
about both spawning and migration behavior.241 Any market in bluefin catch 
shares would have to be geographically limited, which would increase the 
complexity of oversight while reducing the efficiency gains from allowing 
trades. Bycatch regulation would also remain necessary. Global tuna fisheries 
produce substantial bycatch of seabirds, sea turtles, marine mammals, 
sharks, and unmarketable finfish.242 Catch shares by themselves would do 
nothing to control that bycatch. 
Catch shares also would do little to close the enforcement gap. IUU 
fishing has been a notorious problem for bluefin management, and not just 
for the developing nations participating in the fishery. According to a Pew 
Environment Group study, the amount of Atlantic bluefin traded in the 
market in 2010 was two-and-a-half times the official quota.243 Another 
study implicated European governments in that trade.244 The root problem 
seems to be a lack of political will to take bluefin fishing restrictions  
seriously. Catch shares, in theory, could provide increased resources for 
enforcement, but only if enough shares are auctioned to the highest bidder. 
That seems unlikely on the international stage, where nations can be  
expected to jealously guard the interests of their industry. Catch shares also 
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should put share holders on the side of better regulation, because illegal 
catch drives down the value of their shares. That assumes, however, that the 
share holders or their governments can take effective enforcement steps. In 
a far-flung deepwater fishery involving disparate participants, share holders 
themselves can do little to stop IUU fishing. Under current law, individual 
nations (outside their own EEZs) and the RFMOs also have only limited 
authority. International catch shares are not the answer to the enforcement 
problem. They are just as dependent on improved enforcement will and 
capacity as conventional management. 
CONCLUSION 
To date, most of the enthusiasm for catch share strategies comes from 
economists. There may be particular reasons for skepticism when econo-
mists promote property rights approaches. Their disciplinary training and 
orientation tends to make them see efficiency as an especially important 
goal and markets as a particularly useful tool for achieving that goal.245 
Looked at from a broader perspective, catch shares, like other policy  
prescriptions, are tools that are right for some jobs but not others. Their 
usefulness for management of any fishery cannot be answered in isolation. 
The answer is not uniformly yes or no; the correct answer is “it depends on 
the context.” Before a property rights approach (or any other broad policy 
strategy) is adopted, it should be evaluated in context from a variety of 
disciplinary perspectives. After implementation, evaluation should continue. 
The first step in deciding whether catch shares have a role to play in 
the management of a specific fishery is identification of management goals, 
and prioritization among goals that are or may be in tension. The next step 
is to compare the goals to what catch shares can do, identifying the benefits 
they are intended to provide and any costs they may impose. A property 
rights-based approach is most likely to be helpful if reducing industry  
inefficiency is a high priority goal. But reducing inefficiency often has 
distributional costs; in deciding whether to use a property rights approach 
and if so how to bound trading, the relevant policymakers must decide 
whether or not efficiency gains outweigh distributional costs. 
Other conclusions about the efficacy of catch shares are more difficult 
to draw with confidence, at least at the broadest scale. There is some  
evidence that introduction of catch shares may have positive effects on 
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stewardship of target species, but so far that evidence is more of correlation 
than of causation. There are sound theoretical reasons to believe that catch 
shares can encourage stewardship behavior, provided that the economics of 
the fishery are right. So far there is very little evidence about the impact of 
catch shares on ecosystems and non-target species, but again theory suggests 
that impact is likely to be context-specific. If the ecological problems result 
from the need of financially strapped fishers to cut costs or from the frenzy 
of a short-term derby fishery, catch shares should help. If they come from 
other sources, however, such as a close association between target and non-
target species or the gear used in the fishery, catch shares alone will do little 
to help. There is both theoretical and empirical reason to believe that catch 
shares can reduce resistance to lowered TACs, and perhaps to other conser-
vation measures. Again, this effect is a function of the economics of the 
particular fishery. It will occur if, but only if, fishery participants have a 
sufficiently long time horizon, view their property interest as secure for the 
relevant time, and believe that conservation measures are necessary for 
sustainable exploitation of their target species. The shift to a catch share 
strategy will increase conflict over allocation of rights, and will not reduce 
value conflicts over the ethical acceptability of resource exploitation. 
In no case is specification of property rights a complete substitute for 
fishery regulation. Total allowable catches must still be determined, and 
gear limits and seasonal restrictions may still be necessary for sustainable 
harvest and to protect non-target species. Enforcement of these restrictions 
will remain a challenge, particularly in far-flung fisheries with many available 
landing sites and direct retail marketing opportunities. Catch shares  
themselves introduce the need for another layer of administration and 
enforcement, tracking share ownership and ensuring that it matches catch 
or landings. 
None of this is to say that catch shares are not a useful fishery  
management approach. Although more empirical study of their impacts is 
needed, it seems clear that catch shares can provide a path to reduced capacity 
and increased long-term sustainability of target species harvest in many 
domestic fisheries in developed nations. Where these are the key management 
goals, catch shares will often be the preferred strategy. 
That preference should not be automatically imported to the trans- or 
inter-national context. Value conflicts, which may not be readily apparent 
on the surface, may mean that nations that share an interest in a stock have 
irreconcilable management goals. Catch shares will not solve those conflicts, 
and may even make them more intractable. Even if their goals coincide, 
nations and individuals engaged in international fisheries may deeply  
mistrust one another’s motives, or the motives or interpretations of the 
management entity. That sort of mistrust may make it impossible to agree 
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on the nature of “the fisheries problem,” or on essential details such as the 
appropriate allocation of rights among nations or extent of restrictions on 
transfer. Finally, enforcement is a special challenge in the international 
fishery context. Lack of capacity for and commitment to enforcement will 
exacerbate the trust issues between participants. 
Property rights approaches to resource management problems seem to 
be on the rise globally, and have become especially dominant in domestic 
fisheries. They have understandable appeal in the high seas context, in light 
of concerns about rapidly declining global fisheries. They are not, however, 
the right tool for addressing the current woes of the world’s oceans. Their 
implementation would face high practical and political barriers, without 
promising concomitantly high conservation benefits. Only after clarifying 
joint goals and overcoming the enforcement challenges should the interna-
tional fishery community worry about how to introduce catch share 
management strategies. 
